“The role of religion in Mozambican human values: a
case study”
Costa, P.R.
patriciacosta@yahoo.com
ISCTE, Portugal
Studies have repeatedly
demonstrated an existing relation between value priorities and a multiplicity
of attitudes and behaviours, including religiosity (Barnea & Schwartz,
1994). Religion exerts a great influence on our social environment, and is
important as a powerful social movement itself. For example, religion as been considered
more advanced than science, also a social movement, as it motivates people more
effectively (Adler, 1998). Social harmony of heterogonous
religious societies presupposes a foundation of shared values. Still, not all
values are compatible. Indeed, if there are conflicting values within a
religion, most notably, there are antagonistic values between different
religions. Because religions often involve undisputable authority and a single
truth, such value differences express tensions that may erupt in an open
conflict (Riis, 1999). The new global framework is challenging the religious
identity and the status of religion in many regions of the world and changing
previous normative standards into prescribed irregularities. Thus, at a time when religiously based conflict is more common now than at any
time since the mid-1600s (Spickard, 1999), understanding the role played by religion in human values is extremely important as people
become increasingly aware of the existence of multiple worldviews.
Mozambique is a country of
800,000 km², with Portuguese as the official language, which lends unity to a
country formed by sixteen language groups with their respective tongues. In
1997, it had 17 million inhabitants, 75% of them less than fifteen years of
age. Fittingly, Mozambique is characterised by a very heterogeneous population:
the approximate rate of illiteracy is 78%; only a minority speaks the national
language, and although 99% of the population belong to indigenous ethnic
groups, and 50% maintain indigenous beliefs, the existent 20% of Muslim
population is considered quite influential (Frye,
2001).
Evangelization in Mozambique developed along
Portuguese colonization after the fifteenth century. While the tribes in Mozambique practiced
their traditional rites and cults to the ancestors, the Portuguese desired to
spread Catholic faith and so were accompanied by priests to lend spiritual
assistance and celebrate the sacraments. Islamism was, at that time, the
religion of a commercial minority situated in the coast. During these five
centuries there were various attempts at evangelization, which ended with
political independence and the adoption of a Marxist orientation. After Independence in 1975,
missionaries were expelled and returned to their countries, seminarians were
"nationalized" and young students were sent to be educated according
to the socialist spirit, and 90% of the Catholics are said to have abandoned
their faith (Velo, 1999). Nevertheless, a civil war would follow and it was not
until 1992 that government and guerillas signed for peace. Currently, the south
of Mozambique
has a small Muslim population compared to the north of the country. “Their attitudes are a concern but [in
the south] they lack demographic weight.
On the contrary for the last five centuries on the northern coast almost all
the inhabitants belong by tradition to Islam. Although they do not practice
their religion, they were born in an Islamic tradition and consider themselves
Muslims” (Velo, 1999: 3). According
to Velo, previous collaboration between Christians and Muslims ended with the
end of the civil war. At that time, The African Muslim Agency is meant to have started an intense campaign of
Islamic propaganda, which, according to the author, ended in an increasingly
Islamic influence present in a higher number of mosques, means of social
communication, assiduity in prayer, and Islamic feasts.
The
study of the relation between social values and religion is quite an important
one. Values are imparted through everyday exposure to
costumes, laws, norms, scripts, and practices (Markus & Kitayama, 1994),
which includes exposure to religion. For
example, a society where success is highly valued is likely to have a
competitive economic system, whereas a culture that emphasises group well being
is likely to be characterized by more co-operative economic and legal systems.
Consequently, the dynamic of values
influences social behaviour by
coordinating individual behaviour and social interaction. Then, we can say that religion plays a role in
influencing social life by influencing individuals’ needs for
social interaction, which certainly differs from religion to religion, and,
simultaneously, is influenced by these values as it involves behaving in
accordance with them. At a time where globalisation involves the
universalisation of values and consequent behaviours, with applicable
international laws, as is the case, for example, of human rights, development goals, or war on terrorism, issues of religion and values
became a current, often polemic, debate. In fact, the issue of
globalization has raised many discussions on the relation between human values
and religion as, while some defend that certain human values should be
universal, others defend that human values just express specific worldviews (Spickard, 1999).
For the purpose of this
article, "religion" will refer to a set of beliefs and values
pertaining to a “socially-affirmed
worldview” and to a respective set of goals to pursue (Spickard, 1999) and
assume that different relations between values associated with religion cannot
produce superior or inferior worldviews. The paper shall now approach
differences in the literature between Islamic and Christian values. On the
differences between Islamic and Christian values, some have argued that
Christian societies see individuals as being ‘above’ the collective, while
Islam protects the person by emphasising the collective need to maintain a just
society (Donnelly, 1982). In other words, traditional Islam puts the collective
above the individual. Although traditional Muslim thought is often associated
with anti-individualism, this is not the same to say that Islam values
undermine the participation of individuals in social life. On the contrary,
social interconnectedness finds a good expression in the respective religious
values of social order, where people are supposed to take care, and
responsibility for each other, equality of access to work, education, and to
cultural affairs. Thus, one can assume that, within a diverse society, as is
the case of Mozambique, religion plays a
definite role in the organization of values, though the principal of
organization might not be as clear and direct as individual versus collective
oriented values. The paper will now take a deeper look at values theories in
order to expound how have values generally been looked at and how might that
help us understanding the role of religion in organizing these values in the
Mozambican society.
The idea of Individualism
and Collectivism is not a new one (see Schwartz and Bilsky, 1990). Largely, individualism and
collectivism represent the opposite between caring for you versus being cared
for by in-group members (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Hui & Triandis, 1986;
Triandis, 1989). Dynamically, individualism is related to urbanised,
industrialised, and wealthy societies, while collectivism is related to
traditional, agricultural societies (Singelis et al., 1995). In fact, research
suggests (Topalova, 1997; Goodwin, 1998) that this social pattern will still
apply even if values are submitted to sudden changes (e.g. the formerly
Communist Bulgaria). Generally, researchers would view
East Asian cultures as Collectivistic and Western cultures (with U.S.A. leading) as individualistic (e.g., Kim
et al., 1994; Markus & Kitayama, 1994; Triandis, 1990). These cultural
dimensions are supposed to emerge from specific cultural circumstances, namely,
religion (Kim et. al., 1994). It is noteworthy that this distinction has
actually benefited from wide evidence and supportive findings were found across
numerous nations.
Recently, varied
critiques have been raised to the individualism-collectivism dichotomy (e.g.
Kagitcibasi, 1994; Schwartz, 1990, 1994). A frequent criticism is that the
concepts derive from western research and therefore the items used may have
different meanings in the different cultures (Moghaddam, 1987; cf. Yang &
Yue, 1988). Furthermore, it misinterprets certain values by focusing on
personal versus in-group interests, because certain values serve both interests
(e.g., wisdom, mature love). For example, a re-examination (Schwartz, 1990) of
Rokeach’s (1973) findings ingroup differences showed that it was actually
priests who gave greater importance to independent thought, choice, action and
creativity, previously considered exclusive of individualistic concerns.
Therefore, the results illustrate the effect of confounding variables other
than the effect of the same variable (Fijneman et al. 1996; Schwartz, 1994)
However,
despite criticisms, the Individualism-Collectivism dichotomy provided an
insightful view to group differences. Schwartz (1990: 151) concluded, “This
is not contend, however, that the Individualism-Collectivism dichotomy is
without merit… [but] finer distinctions are needed
to attain a sharper and more accurate understanding of cultural and individual
differences”. Schwartz (1990) presented theoretical and empirical
arguments for why this dichotomy should be replaced by newer conceptualisations
of value dimensions. Schwartz’s proposal is far more complex and it embraces a
wider index of values. According to Schwartz (1990), the concept of individualism
vs. collectivism cultures should be replaced by the idea of individualistic
versus collectivist values, which do not necessarily conflict, but might
co-exist in society. Therefore, values are organized in a continuum,
representing the shared motivational emphasis. This
article shall adopt Schwartz’s definition of values.
Schwartz does
not deny that individuals might have individualistic or collectivistic goals,
but argues that these are incompatible. While individualistic values serve the
interests of the individual, the collective values concern prosocial
motivations, that is, promote the interests of others. Subsequently,
multi-dimensional dimensions are needed in order to encapsulate the
dimensionality of cultural differences (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1990). Schwartz
& Bilsky (1987) define values
as beliefs that presume inherent feelings, refer to desirable goals and to the
behaviours that lead to the achievement of these goals. For example, being
helpful probably reflects a belief in social equality. Therefore, values work
as criteria for judging and selecting behaviour and are organized by importance
so that priority is given to values that promote the most important goals. Schwartz mapped values into ten
value types, reflecting common goals and requirements: power, achievement,
hedonism, stimulation self-direction, benevolence, tradition, and conformity.
He hypothesised that power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation and
self-direction serve individual interests while tradition, conformity,
security, universalism, and benevolence values serve collective interests. In
accordance with these, Schwartz’ s (1990) results showed that more
collectivistic societies, like Hong Kong and Spain, might favour achievement
values.
Finally, four higher dimensions
are proposed to organize the relationship among motivational value types, which
are subsequently summarised by two basic, bipolar dimensions. Higher dimensions
emerge from the compatibilities observed between values while basic dimensions
emerge from the compatibilities between higher orders. The four
higher dimensions are openness to change, conservation, self-enhancement, and
self-transcendence. Openness to change represents the values that motivate one
to follow one’s own intellectual and emotional interests in unpredictable and
uncertain directions; this is necessarily in conflict with conservation, which
represents the values regarding motivations to preserve the statues quo and the
certainty which relationships with close others, institutions and traditions
provide. This conflict symbolises one basic dimension. The dimension of
self-enhancement reflects the values that enhance individuals’ own personal
interests, even if it implies costs to others, and is in conflict with
self-transcendence, which characterizes values in terms of motivations to
transcend selfish concerns and promote the welfare of others, close and
distant, and of nature. This conflict symbolises the second basic dimension.
The value type hedonism is related both to openness to change and to
self-enhancement.
Succinctly, the objectives of this study are: 1) to
test whether, within one country, religiously different regions exhibit
different values. 2) To assess how Schwartz’s theory can be useful in
understanding religiously different approaches within one single cultural
setting, and finally, 3) to evaluate whether a combination of Schwartz’s values
with individual and collective values is possible or better approach given the
context.
We hypothesise that 1) religion will be an
important factor in values of different religiously different regions; 2) that
Schwartz’s value types and higher dimensions will be significantly different in
different religious regions, and 3) that individualistic versus collectivistic
values will benefit understanding values in religiously different regions
within one country.
An adaptation of Schwartz’s (1994) value survey was used to assess values. The questionnaire
comprised 30 items and respondents were asked to rate the degree of importance
of a value “AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE” on a 5-point scale (from opposed
to my values to extremely important to me).
Participants were 144 subjects, 71 youngsters, and
73 adults. 49% of the population lived in a Muslim province and 50.7% in a
Christian province.
Variables
Independent
variables were religion, age group, and gender. Age group and gender were used
as control variables in order to guarantee that these had no effect on results.
Dependent variables were values (single, organised in value types and in value
dimensions).
Univariate Analysis of Variance looked at results.
When looking at the values’ rating one can see relevant differences at
different levels. The significant differences found are as follows:
Table 1: Analysis
of effects of religion, gender, and age group
These results indicate that there was a significant
effect of religion (F (1,136) = 2.961, p<.001). There was no significant effect of gender (F (1,136) = 1.367, p = .244) or age group (F (1,136) = 2.696, p = .103). There was no significant
interaction between any of the variables. Thus, we conclude that both gender and
age group are not independent variables in this study.
Furthermore, these results support our first
hypothesis that religion is an important factor in values of different
religiously different regions
The following
tables present means and reports ANOVA findings for Schwartz’s
value types, that is, values grouped by common goals and requirements.
Table 2: One-way
between-subjects ANOVA results for Schwartz’s value types 
As one can see, four
value types (achievement (F (1,142)
= 10.188, p = .002), universalism (F (1,142)
= 5.586, p = .019), benevolence (F (1,142)
= 6.670, p = .011), and tradition (F (1,142)
= 8.184, p = .005)) present significant differences between groups and one
other (self-direction (F (1,142)
= 3.369, p = .069)) is tendentiously different between groups. Thus, these
findings support our second hypothesis which postulated that Schwartz’s value
types would be significantly different in different religious regions. Next, we
will look at mean results for value types in order to understand the direction
of the difference.
Table 3: Mean
results for Schwartz’s 10 value types 
These results suggest that value types that are
significantly different or tendentiously significantly different between religious groups, all have a higher
mean in the Christian group (achievement
(M Christian=4.38, M Muslim=3.83; universalism (M Christian=3.91,
M Muslim = 3.71, benevolence M Christian=3.53,
M Muslim = 3.61, and tradition (M Christian =4.09,
M Muslim = 3.81))
Table 4: ANOVA
results for Schwartz’s four higher dimensions
Thus, findings indicate
that there are significant differences concerning three out four Schwartz’s
higher dimensions (self-enhancement (F (1,142)
= 4.296, p = .040); self-transcendence (F
(1,142) = 9.021, p = .003); conservation (F (1,142) = 7.546, p = .007)) and there is a tendency for the fourth dimension to
be significant
(openness to change (F (1,142)
= 3.369, p = .069)). Next, we shall
look at mean results in order to understand what the direction of these
differences is.
Table 5: Mean
results for Schwartz’s four higher dimensions
Table 6: ANOVA results
for Schwartz’s individualistic versus collectivistic values 
Here, we can see that when values are grouped into
individual versus collective values, according to Schwartz’s distinction, they
become significantly different between Christian and Muslim regions. Thus, both
individualistic (F(1,142) = 7.999, p< .005) and
collectivistic (F(1,142) = 10.014, p< .002)
values are significantly different between religiously different regions.
Table 7: Mean results for
Schwartz’s individualistic versus collectivistic values 
As results show a tendency for the Christian region
to rate higher most of the values, once again, the option was to produce a
graph of value ratings.
Graph 3: rating of collectivistic and
individualistic values by the Christian group, in percentage
Graph 4: rating of collectivistic and
individualistic values by the Muslim group, in percentage 
Thus,
although the Christian group rate higher both values, one can see that the
63.8% of the Christian group rate individualistic values as “very important”,
while only 37.2% of the Muslim group rate equally the same values. Furthermore,
there is a higher percentage of people in the Muslim group rating
individualistic values as “not important” (4.7%) compared to the same rating by
the Christian group (1.7%). In addition, although there is 79.3% of Christian
group rating collective values as “very important”, versus 71% in the Muslim
group, overall, if we had the 12.1% of “important” values to the rating of
collectivistic values by Christians, and the 26.7% equally rated by Muslims in
the same values.
These
results confirm our third hypothesis that
individualistic and collectivistic values benefit understanding values in
religiously different regions within one country.
Conclusion
Generally, it
seems possible to conclude that a general coherence in national values does not
prevent individuals from differing in the overall strength of these values. In fact,
religious contexts seem to be one important determinant of differences found in
values. Accordingly, previous studies have found religious practice to be
correlated with attitudes concerning both political viewpoints and proposed
universal values (e.g. human rights) (in Spini & Doise, 1998). Furthermore,
values differ in the relative efficacy people attribute to institutions
(governmental and political parties) and to themselves for having these values
respected (Doise et al., 1999). Thus, it seems plausible to argue that
religious viewpoints can collide with values since the dynamics of religion in
society (its respect by institutions, its general regional and national
cohesion, its support, or lack of it, by the government, etc) most probably
strongly contributes to differences found in religious positioning towards
values.
Schwartz’s
(1990) value types and dimensions have revealed important in understanding
differences based on religion. Thus, these results suggest that Muslim and
Christian populations differ in important values – namely, universalism,
benevolence, achievement, and tradition - whereby Christians rate all the
values higher. This result, further explored in the ratings presentation by
graphics, was interpreted as a generous use of the scale. However, it is also
possible that these values do not represent important values for a Muslim
population and therefore they have not identified with most of the values
presented. In fact, this line of thought would follow suggestions that the
universalisation of values derived from the Cold War
when capitalist societies politically opposed, and considered better, ‘their’
values of freedom and individual achievement to the values of economic and
social equality, characteristic of the then Communist societies. Accordingly,
some have argued that privileged modern values, which would certainly include
definitions of values studied by science, would steam from Western philosophic
principles and is thus not applicable to other civilisations: “Value
systems, such as ... freedom of the
press, are choices which each society must make. In the United
States, individuals … are
placed ahead of law and order. In Asia, law and
order have priority ... These are simply alternative value systems. None are
superior over the other. Asians and Westerners must emancipate themselves from
notions that Western value systems are superior …” (in Chew, 1994: 936).
Furthermore, the distinction between Individualistic and Collectivistic values has
proved a helpful tool in understanding group differences, as both have revealed
significantly different between groups. Thus, although results indicate that the
Christian group rates higher both individualistic and collectivistic values,
the exploratory analysis of this rating indicates that further analysis should
be taken in order to improve the comprehension of different motivations to
these values. Still, these results are in line with previous research that found
a link between Individualism/Collectivism and religion (Kim et. al., 1994).
Along these lines, while criticisms to Individualism/Collectivism argued the
items could have different meanings in different cultures (Moghaddam, 1987; cf.
Yang & Yue, 1988), the fact that this research is carried in one nation,
might approximate the meanings of the items, and that might become an added
strength to using these concepts in this research, instead of the opposite.
This piece of
research indicates that a combination of Schwartz’ values with the insights
brought forward by the Individualism/ Collectivism proposal might create a
powerful tool of analysis in certain contexts, where the simple analysis of
universal values is not enough, especially if one is investigating differences
within a single nation. Schwartz’s distinction between individual and
collective values seems to add strength to his theory, which revealed important
in the understanding of the role of religion in shaping human values. Overall,
although many questions are now raised, it seems that many doors have also been
open for forthcoming research. One improvement for future research is to
investigate further personal views of the relation between religion and values.
Thus, exploring differences in the relation between religious beliefs,
practices, and communities of individuals and the surrounding society improves
our comprehension of the ways in which historical, cultural and religious
narratives influence values and beliefs. Accordingly, it seems most important
to investigate further the historical and social influences that shape
individual and communal identities with regard to questions of religion. Most
importantly for present times, exploring the social influences in worldviews
from a religious standpoint implies evaluating how dynamics of power and the demands
of justice affect situations of conflicting interests and values. On reflection
upon the actual global scenery, gaining substantial insight into the
relationship between religious traditions and modern society, between religious
values and contemporary values, ideas and beliefs, is not only a great
contribution to research but also a necessary and crucial tool to the
comprehension of the world we live in.
·
Adler,
A. (1998). Social interest. (Colin Brett,
Eds). New York: Oneworld Publications
·
Barnea,
M.F.; Schwartz, S.H.
(1994). Values and voting. Manuscript submitted for publication
·
Chew, M. (1994). Human Rights in Singapore. Asian Survey 34(11): 933-48.
·
Doise, W.;
Spini, D.; Clémence, A. (1999). Human rights studied as social
representations in a cross-cultural context. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 29, 1 – 29
·
Doise, W.;
Dell’Ambrogio, P., & Spini D. (1991). Psychologie sociale et
Droits de l’Homme. Revue
Internationale de Psychologie Sociale, 4 (3/4), 257 – 277
·
Donnelly, J. (1982). Human
Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of
Human Rights. American Political
Science Quarterly 76(2): 303-16.
·
Fijneman,
Y.; Willemsen, M.E.; Poortinga, Y.H. et al. (1996). Individualism-collectivism
an empirical study of a conceptual issue. Journal of Cross-Cultural
Psychology, 27, 381 – 402
·
Frye. (2001). Moçambique: ensaios. Revista engenho. Ed. UFRJ: Rio de Janeiro. www.funesc.com.br/engenho3/textos/ecul_to3.htm
·
Goodwin,
R. (1998). Personal Relationships Across Cultures. Routledge: London, UK
·
Hofstede,
G. (1980). Culture’s
Consequences, International Differences in Work-Related Values. Sage: London, UK
·
Hofstede,
G. (1994). Cultures
and Organizations: Software of the mind. Harper-Collins, London
· Hogg, M.A.; Vaugham, G.M. (1998). Social
Psychology (2nd ed). Prentice Hall Europe: Hertfordshire, UK
· Hui, C.H.; Triandis, H.C. (1986). Individualism-collectivism: a study of
cross-cultural researchers. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 17, 225
– 248
· Kagitcibasi, C. (1994). A critical appraisal of
individualism and collectivism. In Kim, U.; Triandis, H.C.;
Kagitcibasi, C.; Choi, S.-C.; Yong, G. (ed.). Individualism and
collectivism: theory, method and applications (pp. 52 – 65). Sage, Thousand Oaks, CAKaplan, B.H.; Cassel, J.C.; Gore, S. (1977). Social
support and health. Medical care, 15, 47 – 58
· Kim, U.; Triandis,
H.C.; Kagitcibasi, C.; Choi, S.-C.; Yong, G. (1994). Individualism
and collectivism: theory, method and applications. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA
· Markus, H.R.; Kitayama, S. (1994). A collective fear of the
collective: implications for selves and theories of selves. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 568 – 579
·
Moghaddam,
F.M. (1987). Psychology in three worlds: as reflected by the crisis in social
psychology and the move toward indigenous third-world psychology. American
Psychologist, 42, 912 – 920
·
Riis, O.
(1999). Modes of Religious Pluralism under Conditions of
Globalisation". MOST
Journal on Multicultural Societies, vol.1, no.1
·
Rokeach,
M. (1973). The
nature of human values. Free Press, New York
·
Schwartz,
S.H. (1990).
Individualism-Collectivism: Critique and Proposed Refinements. Journal of
Cross-Cultural Psychology, Vol. 21, No. 2, 139-157
·
Schwartz,
S.H. (1992). Universals
in the Content and Structure of Values: theoretical Advances and Empirical
Tests in 20 Countries. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 25,
pp.1 – 65
· Schwartz, S. H. (1994a). Studying Human Values. In
Bouvy, A.; Vijver, F.; Boski, P.; Schmitz, P. Journeys Into Cross-Cultural
Psychology. (pp. 239 – 254). Swets & Zeitlinger: Amsterdam
· Schwartz, S. H. (1994b). Are there
universal aspects in the structure and contents of Human values? Journal
of Social Issues, Vol. 50, No., Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 19-45
·
Schwartz,
S. H. (1997) Values and Culture. In Mumro,
D.; Schumaker, J.F.; Carr, S.C. (pp.69-84). Motivation & Culture.
Routledge: New York
·
Schwartz,
S. H. (1999). Cultural Dimensions and Value Types.
Workshop presented at the IACCP Conference, Graz, Austria, 1999
·
Schwartz,
S. H.; Bilsky, W.
(1987). Toward psychological structure of human values. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, Vol.53, 550-562
·
Schwartz,
S. H.; Bilsky, W.
(1990). Toward a Theory of the Universal Content and structure of Values:
Extensions and Cross-Cultural Replications. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, Vol.58, No.5, 878-891
·
Schwartz,
S. H.; Bilsky, W. (1990b). Toward a Theory of the
Universal Content and structure of Values. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, Vol.53, No.3, 550-562
·
Schwartz,
S.H.; Huisman, S. (1995).
Value priorities and religiosity in four Western religions. Social
Psychology Quarterly, 58, 88 – 107
· Schwartz, S.H.; Sagiv, L. (1995). Value Priorities and
Readiness for Out-Group Social Contact. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, Vol. 69, No. 3, 437 – 448
·
Singelis, T.M.; Triandis, H.C.; Bhawuk, D.S.; Gelfand,
M.
(1995). Horizontal and vertical dimensions of individualism and
collectivism: a theoretical and measurement refinement. Cross-Cultural
Research, 29, 240 – 275
· Spickard, J.V. (1999). Human Rights, Religious Conflict, and Globalization.
Ultimate Values in a New World Order. MOST Journal on Multicultural
Societies, vol.1, no.1
· Spini, D.; Doise, W. (1998). Organizing
principles of involvement in human rights and their social anchoring in value
priorities. European Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 603 – 622
· Topalova, V. (1997). Individualism/Collectivism and social
identity. Journal of Community and Applied Psychology, 7, 53 – 64
· Triandis, H.C.
(1989). The Self and
Social Behaviour in Differing Cultural Contexts. Psychological Review,
Vol. 96, No. 3, pp. 506 – 520
·
Triandis,
H.C. (1990). Cross-cultural studies of individualism and
collectivism. In Berman, J. (ed.) Nebraska
symposium on motivation. University of Nebraska
Press, Lincoln
·
Triandis, H.
C.(1995). Individualism &
Collectivism. Westview Press: London
·
Thompson, R.; Davies, A. (2000). A study of parenting in the provinces of Maputo and Zambezia
to determine the nature of a guide to parenting for basic education. The
Pedagogical University.
·
Velo,
M.(1999).
http://www.famvin.org/cm/curia/vincentiana/1999/1999/VT994/VT994-18-IN-Velo.html.
·
Yang,
K.S.; Yue, A.B. (1988).
Social-oriented and individual-oriented achievement motives:
conceptualisation and measurement. Paper presented at the XXIV
International Congress of Psychology, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
